Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 3

Article 10

2005

The Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property
Rights, and Protectionism - an Age-Old Tale
Michael P. Simpson

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Michael P. Simpson, The Future of Innovation: Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism - an Age-Old Tale, 70 Brook. L. Rev.
(2005).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol70/iss3/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

2/16/2005 2:38:18 PM

The Future of Innovation
TRADE SECRETS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND
PROTECTIONISM—AN AGE-OLD TALE
*

Innovation makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old
regime, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who
would prosper under the new. Their support is indifferent partly
from fear and partly because they are generally incredulous, never
really trusting new things unless they have tested them by
experience.1

INTRODUCTION
The forces that Machiavelli described over half a
millennium ago continue to shape our world of innovation
Through
recent
common-law
and
statutory
today.2
developments favoring industry, the power of the old is holding
back the development of the new. Although the Constitution
gives the federal government the power to control these forces
for the betterment of society,3 the current trade secret
framework concentrates too much power in the hands of
industry, threatening innovation by allowing industrialists to
“steer evolution as it benefits them.”4
*

© 2005 Michael P. Simpson. All Rights Reserved.
NICCOLÒ MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 17 (W.W. Norton 2d ed. 1992) (1515).
2
See id.
3
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Constitution gives Congress the power
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries[.]” Id. The Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated that the policy goals
surrounding both copyright and patent law are to benefit society, not industry. See,
e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative
labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good.”); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole
interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”).
4
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 264 (2001) (“That power is not
within our tradition. It is not what has built the America we admire.”).
1
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This Note argues that developments in the area of trade
secret law have swung the pendulum too far in the direction of
industry. By rooting trade secret law in an intellectual property
based rationale, both the common law and recent
Congressional enactments have expanded trade secret law well
beyond its original parameters. This expansion is unfortunate,
both from a theoretical and practical vantage point: aside from
drawing false analogies to patent and copyright law, this new
regime is causing society to suffer by unduly constricting the
spread of useful and innovative ideas. Instead, this Note
contends that the pendulum must swing back in the favor of
society in order for trade secret law to serve the
constitutionally mandated policy goals that intellectual
property laws purport to serve.5 To achieve this objective, this
Note proposes two solutions that may help to equilibrate
industry’s interests with those of society.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I summarizes the
current law of trade secrets. Part II illustrates how the
pendulum has swung too far in the favor of industry, with Part
II.A outlining the Supreme Court’s adoption of a traditional
intellectual property rationale and Part II.B explaining the
reasoning and legislative history behind the Economic
Espionage Act (EEA), a statute that imposes criminal sanctions
for the theft of trade secrets. Part III illustrates some of the
major deficiencies in the law, both theoretical and practical,
and utilizes practical examples to demonstrate the problems in
the current trade secret framework that have been exacerbated
by the EEA. Finally, Part IV proposes two solutions to help
swing the pendulum back towards the constitutionally
mandated policy goal of benefiting society.
I.

TRADE SECRETS: BACKGROUND

A.

Fundamentals of Trade Secret Law

The central purpose of trade secret law is to protect
secret and commercially valuable information from being
misappropriated. Just about everyone has heard of the famous
formula for Coca-Cola,6 or the eleven secret “herbs and spices”

5

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also supra text accompanying note 3.
See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D.
288, 289 (D.C. Del. 1985).
6
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that make KFC’s chicken so tasty.7 Trade secret law protects
important formulas like these as well as other commercially
valuable information.
Although trade secret doctrines vary throughout
jurisdictions, there is a general consensus that to establish
liability for trade secret misappropriation, a plaintiff must
show that the information at issue is a “trade secret” 8 and that
the defendant acquired, used, or disclosed the information in
breach of confidence or by other improper means.9
There are three basic requirements for something to
qualify as a trade secret: the object at issue must be
“information”;10 that information must confer a competitive
value because it is secret;11 and that information must be
maintained under reasonable safeguards in order to assure
secrecy.12 The “information” requirement is extremely broad in
scope. In contrast to other traditional intellectual property
fields, such as copyrights and patents, trade secrets can protect
technical and non-technical information, expression or ideas,
and even facts. Its protective cloak has been extended to cover
such things as financial information, methods of doing
business, customer lists, supplier lists, future marketing
tactics, sales and product plans, employee names, and even
phone numbers.13
The requirement that “the information be of economic
value because it is secret” merely requires that the information
confer a potential economic advantage to the holder over
competitors. Almost anything can qualify provided that it helps
7

See Gina White, Note, Intellectual Property—Trade Secret Law— Is the
Arkansas Supreme Court Following Other Jurisdictions Down the Wrong Road in
Analyzing Combination Trade Secrets?, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 407, 407 n.2
(citing About KFC, Original Recipe Is Still a Secret, at http://www.kfc.com/about/
secret.html (last visited April 20, 2005)).
8
Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform
Trade Secret Act’s (UTSA) definition of a trade secret. Although New York and a few
others have not, the common-law is very similar to the nuts and bolts of trade secret
law. See C. Rachal Pugh, Nondisclosure Agreement Protected Confidential Information
Which Did Not Qualify for Trade Secret Protection, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 231, 235
(2002).
9
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1), 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
10
See id. at § 1(4). This is a rather broad requirement and one of the major
benefits of trade secret law as opposed to copyright, which only protects expressions,
not ideas, and patents, which require novelty.
11
See 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.02 (1998).
12
Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 248 (citing MILGRIM, supra note 11, §§ 1.03-1.04).
13
Id. (citing 1 MILGRIM, supra note 11, § 1.09).
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to create commercial value.14 In fact, that information does not
even need to be in use to be protected. The Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition15 (“Restatement Third”) protects trade
secrets that can potentially be used.16 This means that it does
not require actual and continuous “use” by the creator to
qualify as a trade secret—for instance, results of research that
are not used directly in one’s business may qualify as trade
secrets under this definition.
“Secrecy” has been defined by courts as any information
that is not known or easily ascertainable through proper means
by a firm’s competitors. “Proper means” commonly include
things such as reverse engineering (obtaining a finished
product and taking it apart in an attempt to discover its secret
of operation) or independent discovery through factual
knowledge already in the public domain.
The final requirement to qualify as a trade secret—
reasonable precautions to maintain the secrecy—is adjudged
according to an objective “reasonableness” standard. Although
a trade secret holder need not take all possible precautions to
satisfy this standard, many companies go to great lengths to
assure this element is met so that the adequacy of their
measures will not be second-guessed in court. To protect their
interests, companies may take various steps, such as:
disclosing the secret only under a confidentiality agreement
and on a need-to-know basis, constructing fences or walls to
block the public’s view, instituting a system of building
security, using passwords, requiring entry and exit interviews
of employees, and restricting employee access to sensitive
areas.17
Once something qualifies as a trade secret, a
defendant’s liability turns on whether the defendant acquired,
used, or disclosed the information by improper means.18

14

See 1 MILGRIM, supra note 11, § 1.09 (listing several different categories
that have been protected).
15
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
16
See Patricia A. Meier, Note, Looking Back and Forth: The Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition and Potential Impact on the Texas Trade Secret Law, 4
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 415, 455 (1995-1996).
17
See Bone, supra note 12, at 249; Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or
Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret
Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV 69, 77 (1999).
18
Improper means may include: breach of contract, violation of a confidential
relationship, bribery, theft, misrepresentation , and other wrongs. See Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (1985).
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“Improper” has been defined by the Restatement Third to
include
“theft,
fraud,
unauthorized
interception
of
communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a
breach of confidence, and other means either wrongful in
themselves or wrongful under the circumstances of the case.”19
There is, however, much room for judicial discretion here,
especially when the conduct seems unethical.20 Yet a proper
acquisition, such as independent creation, reverse engineering,
or acquisition from a public source, is always an absolute
defense.21
Even once all of these elements are established, the
owner generally does not receive a monopoly in the idea or
process that encompasses the secret; instead, trade secret law
only protects the secret from being discovered improperly.22 If
the plaintiff can establish liability, the court usually issues an
injunction and follows with a monetary award of provable
damages.23
The civil law of trade secrets has been codified under a
number of different uniformed schemes—most recently, the
Restatement Third,24 and Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA).25
An owner of a trade secret can also pursue federal criminal
sanctions against a person who misappropriates his/her secret
ideas.

19

See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 43 (1985).
See E.I. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012,
1017 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Improper will always be a word of many nuances, determined by
time, place, and circumstances. We therefore need not proclaim a catalogue of
commercial improprieties.”).
21
These exceptions are not explicitly listed in the UTSA; however, courts
have found them to be implied under the element of secrecy. See Chiappetta, supra
note 17, at 78 n.53.
22
However, it is the contention of this Note that in certain circumstances
trade secret owners are in fact granted a de facto monopoly. This situation occurs most
often when an invention is difficult to reverse engineer, such as an innovation
involving chemical compounds. See infra Part III.B.
23
See Chiappetta, supra note 17, at 79. It is important to take note that this
is merely a general overview of trade secret law, meant only to provide the necessary
background information for the discussion that is to follow. Trade secret law can be a
highly nuanced and varying form of law from state to state, so it is important for a
practitioner to perform an intensive search through jurisdictional case law where the
litigation is to take place. See MILGRIM, supra note 11, §1.01.
24
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39-45 (1995).
25
See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (1985).
20
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The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: Federal Criminal
Sanctions for Trade Secret Theft

In addition to civil liability, the EEA created federal
criminal liability for anyone caught stealing a trade secret.26
While trade secret law was developing on the civil side, it was
argued that a large gap was forming in the effectiveness of
criminal laws protecting the investment of industry in research
and development.27 As the technological age arrived, industrial
espionage, also referred to as “economic espionage,” was
reportedly on the rise. Although industrial espionage and the
stealing of trade secrets had transpired for hundreds of years,28
it was argued that the stakes had never been so high29 and the
means never so elaborate.30 In response, Congress passed the
EEA.31
Liability under section 1831, entitled Economic
Espionage, requires that the theft of trade secrets “benefit a[]
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent . .
. .”32 The term “misappropriation of trade secrets” covers (1)
outright theft,33 (2) unauthorized duplication,34 (3) trafficking in

26

Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000).
James H.A. Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of
1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 177, 178 (1997).
28
See JACQUES BERGIER, SECRET ARMIES: THE GROWTH OF CORPORATE AND
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 3 (Harold J. Salemson trans., 1969) (telling the popular account
of the Chinese princess that hid silk worms in her hat 1,500 years ago, thus supplying
the secret of silk manufacture to India).
29
See Robert C. Van Arnam, Comment, Business War: Economic Espionage
in the United States and the European Union and the Need for Greater Trade Secret
Protection, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 95, 97–98 nn.26-28 (2001). The estimated
loss by the top U.S. companies due to industrial espionage by foreign nations was
estimated to be $45 billion in 2001. The number of jobs lost to industrial spying was
estimated at 6 million. The incidents usually take place between the economically
competitive nations, such as, China, the United States and the member nations of the
European Union. Id.
30
Id. at 99 (“[T]he French intelligence agency recently disclosed that it had
bugged hotel rooms and the first-class cabins of Air France jets and substituted spies
for flight attendants to eavesdrop on visiting foreign executives.”).
31
Economic Espionage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 101(a), 110 Stat. 3488-3490
(1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000)).
32
Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2000).
33
18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(1) (2000) (“[S]teals, or without authorization
appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains
a trade secret . . . .”).
34
18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(2) (2000) (“[W]ithout authorization copies, duplicates,
sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies,
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade
secret[.]”).
27
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stolen trade secrets,35 (4) attempted theft, duplication, or
trafficking,36 and (5) conspiracy to commit any theft,
duplication, or trafficking.37 The EEA also imposes a scienter
requirement.38
Section 1832, entitled Theft of Trade Secrets, is aimed
at domestic thieves.39 It is essentially the same as section 1831,
but includes three additional elements: (1) the intended benefit
realized must be economic in nature;40 (2) the thief must intend
or know that the offense will injure the rightful owner;41 and (3)
the stolen information must be “related to or included in a
product produced for or placed in interstate or foreign
commerce.”42
Because one of the major motivating forces behind the
passage of the EEA was foreign acts of industrial espionage,43
penalties are commensurately harsher for someone who
intentionally or knowingly stole a trade secret to “benefit any
foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.”44
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF TRADE SECRET LAW: AN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RATIONALE

The current state of trade secret law, as represented by
the seminal U.S. Supreme Court decisions of Kewanee Oil Co.
v. Bicron Corp.45 and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,46 and
embodied in the Restatement Third, is a framework that draws

35

18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(3) (2000) (“[R]eceives, buys, or possesses a trade secret,
knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without
authorization . . . .”).
36
18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(4) (2000) (“[A]ttempts to commit any offense described
in any of paragraphs (1) through (3) . . . .”).
37
18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(5) (2000) (“[C]onspires with one or more other persons
to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more
of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy . . . .”).
38
18 U.S.C. § 1831(a) (2000).
39
18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
40
18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000) (noting defendant must intend to convert trade
secret to economic benefit of someone other than owner).
41
18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2000) (indicating defendant must intend or know
threat will injure owner of trade secret).
42
18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2000).
43
See 142 CONG. REC. S 12,211-12 (1996) (discussing the failure of the
current law to ensure the safety of corporations’ valuable research and development
from foreign acts of industrial espionage); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 6 (1996).
44
18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000).
45
416 U.S. 470 (1974).
46
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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from property rights47 rationale akin to that supporting
copyright and patent law. Although this modern construct is
vastly different than the early common law’s Lockean
conception of trade secret law, this evolution did not take place
overnight. The process was incremental—trade secret law’s
original foundation was slowly whittled away and eventually
replaced by economic policy goals commonly articulated for
traditional forms of intellectual property, i.e., copyright and
patent law.
A.

The Current State of Trade Secret Law: From Kewanee
to Monsanto—the Move to a Property Rights Framework
and a Traditional Intellectual Property Rationale

Kewanee and Monsanto are seminal decisions in trade
secret jurisprudence that represent the law’s current rooting in
an intellectual property rights regime.
In Kewanee, the Court had to decide whether Ohio’s
trade secret laws were void under the Supremacy Clause
because they stood as an obstacle to the execution of the
48
purposes and objectives of federal patent laws. The petitioner,
Harshaw Chemical Co. (Harshaw), developed certain processes
that aided in the growth of a 17-inch synthetic crystal that was
useful in the detection of ionizing radiation. The respondents
were former employees of Harshaw who had signed agreements
not to disclose trade secrets obtained as employees. They left
Harshaw and joined the newly created Bicron Corp. (Bicron), a
competitor. Soon after, Bicron also grew a 17-inch crystal.
Harshaw brought a diversity action seeking injunctive relief
and damages for misappropriation of trade secrets.49 The
District Court, applying Ohio trade secret law, granted a
permanent injunction.50 The Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground that Ohio’s trade secret law conflicted with federal

47

The term “property right” is generally used to describe a package of
distinct entitlements granted to an individual, sometimes referred to as a “bundle of
rights.” Property involves legal relationships “among people regarding control and
disposition of valued resources.” JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY
2 (2001). When someone is said to have a “property right” in something, the legal
implications and consequences can be quite different than if their interest were
protected by contract or tort law. This distinction will be explored in greater detail
throughout this Note.
48
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 470.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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patent laws.51 Since Ohio used the same trade secret definition
adopted by the Restatement (First) of Torts and used by a
majority of states at the time, the Supreme Court essentially
held the fate of trade secret law in its grasp.
Holding that Ohio’s trade secret law was not preempted
by the federal patent law, the Court articulated a rationale for
trade secret law that was synonymous with patent and
copyright law. Although it stated two policy goals—“[t]he
maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and the
encouragement of invention”52—the incentive-based policy
argument of encouraging innovation won the day.53 The Court
in Kewanee adopted a policy rationale for trade secrets
analogous to the economic rationale that supported limited
monopolies in copyrights and patents.54 Essentially, trade
secrets were believed to enhance the incentive to create,
thereby benefiting society.
Following Kewanee, the Court in Monsanto.55 further
affirmed that trade secret law was now being viewed as a form
of intellectual property. In Monsanto, an applicant for
registration of a pesticide brought suit to avoid the datadisclosure requirement created by the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1972 (FIFRA).56 Monsanto
sought injunctive and declaratory relief alleging that FIFRA
effected a “taking” of property without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.57 The trial court declared the
challenged provisions of the act unconstitutional and
permanently enjoined the EPA from implementing or enforcing
it.58 The Supreme Court, in reviewing the trial court’s decision,
did not hold FIFRA unconstitutional, but did hold that
Monsanto’s trade secret right was a “property right protected
by the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”59
51

Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. et al., 478 F.2d 1074, 1086 (6th Cir. 1972).
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 481.
53
See Bone, supra note 12, at 262 (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 482, 484;
American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 329 (7th Cir. 1984); RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 244 (1981); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal
Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 435-42 (1995)).
54
See 416 U.S. at 481 (stating that one of the broadly stated policies behind
protecting secret information was to motivate creation).
55
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
56
Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 973 (1972).
57
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 986 (1984).
58
Monsanto Co. v. Acting Adm’r, U.S. EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552 (E.D. Mo.
1983).
59
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
52
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The Court found many justifications for granting
Monsanto a property right in its secret formula. First, the
Court utilized the Lockean concept of natural rights to support
its contention. Citing FIFRA’s legislative history, the Court
pointed to the fact that Congress recognized that data
developers had a “proprietary interest”60 in their data and that
they were “‘entitled’ to ‘compensation’ because they ‘have legal
ownership of the data.’”61 The Court argued that this
“perception of trade secrets as property is consonant with a
notion of ‘property’ that extends beyond land and tangible
goods and includes the products of an individual’s ‘labour and
invention.’”62 Essentially, the Court was arguing that Congress
intended the information to be protected as property as a
reward for hard work. The Court utilized the Lockean concept
that labor created rights in “property” to strengthen its
argument that trade secret holders should have property
rights.
In addition, the Court reasoned that trade secrets had
characteristics synonymous with tangible forms of property. As
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, explained: “A trade
secret is assignable. A trade secret can form the res of a trust,
and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy.”63 Thus, he concluded
that “[t]rade secrets have many of the characteristics of more
tangible forms of property.”64 As a result, the Court held that
Monsanto had a property right that was protected by the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.65
The Court’s broad definition of property rights in trade
secrets protected industry in several respects, most notably in
avoiding making disclosures to regulatory agencies when the
product of that disclosure was deemed a trade secret. Most
recently, in Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly,66 cigarette
manufacturers claimed that the Massachusetts Disclosure Act
(MDA),67 which required them to disclose their ingredient lists
to the state, constituted an unconstitutional taking of their
property. Citing Monsanto, the cigarette manufacturers
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 32 (1977)).
Id. (quoting H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1560, at 29 (1978)).
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1002.
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1002.
Id. at 1003-04
312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (2002).
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contended that their ingredient lists were trade secrets and
hence property protected by the Takings Clause. They argued
that mandatory public disclosure of those trade secrets
essentially destroyed their value, thereby effecting a taking.
The First Circuit agreed, reiterating the property concept set
forth in Monsanto repeatedly throughout the decision. The
court reasoned that “[s]pecific laws simply cannot destroy
property interests.”68 It was clear to the court “that the tobacco
companies ha[d] a property interest in their trade secrets”69 and,
since the MDA transformed their “private property into public
property without compensation . . .[,]”70 it was a clear taking
under the Fifth Amendment.
Beyond these judicial decisions, the Restatement Third
codifies trade secret law’s relatively recent shift to a property
regime. It recognizes that trade secret law has adopted the
policy goals for copyright and patent law, explaining that trade
secret protection is justified “as a means to encourage
investment in research by providing an opportunity to capture
the returns from successful innovations.”71
This incentive-based argument reasons that protecting
knowledge and ideas encourages the creation of more such
innovations, thereby benefiting society as a whole.72 Since
knowledge and ideas are intangible objects that are both nonrivalrous (i.e., one person’s consumption does not reduce the
availability of the good to others), and non-excludible (i.e., it is
difficult to exclude others from enjoying their benefits),
reproduction of an idea is potentially limitless. However,
researching and developing new ideas is very expensive. Hence,
economic scholars argue that protection is necessary to prevent
people from free-riding off of others’ valuable investment of
time and money. This incentive-based argument has supported
copyright73 and patent law74 for quite some time and is the
principal rationale supporting trade secrets today.75

68

Phillip Morris, 312 F.3d at 32 (emphasis added).
Id. at 32-33 (emphasis added).
70
Id. at 32 (emphasis added) (citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)).
71
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. a (1995).
72
See Bone, supra note 12, at 262 (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 112-16, 135-49 (1988)).
73
See generally William M. Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325-63 (1989) (applying the rationale to copyright
law).
69
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By importing the policy rationale from patent and
copyright law, trade secret law implicitly adopts their
restrictions as well. That is to say, if the law of trade secrets
were to restrict innovation it would contradict its own policy
goals and frustrate the goals of patent law as well. It would
further be a violation of the Supremacy Clause. The
Constitution gives Congress the power to “promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”76 The Supreme Court
has repeatedly articulated that the purpose and objective of
federal patent law is to benefit society by stimulating and
encouraging innovation. As far back as 1832, in Grant v.
Raymond,77 the Court explicitly stated this policy goal:
[I]t cannot be doubted that the settled purpose of the United States
has ever been, and continues to be, to confer on the authors of useful
inventions an exclusive right in their inventions for the time
mentioned in their patent. It is the reward stipulated for the
advantages derived by the public for the exertions of the individual,
and is intended as a stimulus to those exertions.78

Inventors are given patents, or property rights, in their
inventions as a reward “for the advantages derived by the
public,”79 and to stimulate more inventions for the public good.
If trade secret law frustrated this purpose it would be void
under the Supremacy Clause. The Court’s seminal decision in
Kewanee held that Ohio’s trade secret law did not frustrate this
purpose. In doing so, however, it moved trade secret law
towards the intellectual property regime. Next, Monsanto
protected trade secrets as property under the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause. The Restatement Third
reinforces the fact that trade secrets are now characterized as a

74

See generally Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 247 (1994) (applying the rationale to patent law)).
75
See Bone, supra note 12, at 262 (citing Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 482, 484;
American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 328 (7th Cir. 1984)); RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 244 (1981); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a
Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 427, 435-42 (1995)).
76
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77
31 U.S. 218 (1832).
78
Id. at 241-42.
79
Id.
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form of intellectual property with liability centered on a
violation of the owner’s “property right.”80
These most recent codifications further demonstrate
that this new direction has shifted the law to the benefit of
industry. In several respects, the Restatement Third has
expanded trade secret protection beyond the safeguards
originally developed in the Restatement (First) of Torts. First,
the actual and continuous “use” requirement in the
Restatement (First) of Torts81 has been expanded to include
“potential use,” protecting the results of research that are not
directly used by the business.82 Second, it defines the
misappropriation element more broadly than in previous
formulations of the law. No longer is use or disclosure of the
trade secret required for liability; merely acquiring the trade
secret “improperly” is enough to establish liability.83 This
expansion has proven to be particularly valuable for industries
characterized by rapid and often ephemeral technological
developments, such as computers, software, biotechnology, and
pharmaceuticals.84
But this is not the whole story. As the law expanded on
the civil side, and the conceptualization of trade secrets shifted
towards that of traditional forms of intellectual property,
Congress passed the EEA, a law that greatly increased the
safeguards afforded to industry.
B.

The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: A Tool of Industry

As the common law offered greater protection to
industry, Congress further bolstered these protections by
enacting the EEA. This recent evolution in the law of trade
secrets has supplied owners with a very powerful weapon to
guard their intangible interests. The passing of the EEA helped
80

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b (This “property
rationale emphasizes the nature of the appropriated information, especially its value
and secrecy.” ). Furthermore, “[c]ommentators have argued that the [UTSA], in force in
42 states, adopts a view of trade secrets as property.” Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1042 n.45 (2005) (citing
Lynn C. Tyler, Trade Secrets in Indiana: Property vs. Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 339,
339 (1998)).
81
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
82
See Meier, supra note 16, at 455.
83
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40, cmt. b (1995).
84
Meier, supra note 16, at 454-55 (citing Holly Emrick Svetz, Note, Japan’s
New Trade Secret Law: We Asked for It—Now What Have We Got?, 26 GEO. WASH. J.
INT’L L. & ECON. 413, 414 (1992)).
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change trade secrets from what was once thought of as a
supplemental system, catching ideas and inventions that fell
through the grasps of patent law, into a system grounded in
property rights that constricts the flow of ideas through
criminal sanctions. It has effectively swung the pendulum
directly towards the interests of industry.
Despite its lofty goals, the EEA is a bill that was clearly
sponsored by, and passed to benefit, big business. In the early
1990s, big business created an uproar over the large amounts
of money lost due to industrial espionage. A representative,
speaking on behalf of the bill, articulated these concerns,
stating that “American companies have faced the fact,
unfortunately, that our laws were written so long ago that they
do not deal with the protection of ideas in the way that they
should . . . .”85 This view was bolstered by the reported rise in
trade secret thefts by other countries.
The effect of these crimes, it was believed, endangered
the country’s economic prosperity.86 Making matters worse,
Congress felt the existing system was inadequate to curtail
these economic losses. Prior to the EEA’s passage, federal
prosecutors had no right to pursue someone under a theft of
trade secret action, and state schemes were far more restrictive
than the broad new act because most state civil schemes
required the violator to acquire the trade secret through
“improper means.”87
Sharp increases in cybercrime (crimes where computers
play an intricate role) also presented analytical difficulties.88
The earlier statutes that prosecutors had at their disposal (i.e.,
wire fraud, mail fraud, and trespass) were said to be
inadequate to provide protection.89 It was difficult for
85

142 CONG. REC. H 12137-01 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (statement of Rep.

Lofgren).
86

See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in
Regulating Use of Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L.
REV. 853, 864 n.49 (2002). Moohr states that upon signing H.R. 3723 President William
J. Clinton confirmed “that the ultimate purpose of the EEA is to safeguard the nation’s
security and economic strength by protecting the intellectual capital of American
businesses.” Id.
87
See Aaron Burstein, A Survey of Cybercrime in the United States, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313, 326 (2003).
88
See id. at 315. (“Computer-based activities simply began to fall outside the
act or mens rea requirements (or both) of mail and wire fraud, theft, and trespass. The
result was ‘an unsatisfying, result-oriented jurisprudence.’”).
89
This is exemplified by the decision in United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d
1301 (10th Cir 1991).
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prosecutors to pursue criminal liability under the then-current
law because they needed to “prove that the defendant’s actions
deprived the owner of its property,”90 which proved quite
challenging. For example, in the United States v. Seidlitz91 a
former military contractor stole a password to download
valuable software from his former employer. The Fourth
Circuit quickly concluded that the software was property.92 Yet
Seidlitz merely copied the software, so his conduct did not
actually deprive the employer of its copy of the software. As the
federal wire fraud statute required a deprivation of another’s
property, it was unclear how Seidlitz’s conduct could qualify as
such.93 Faced with these difficulties, “courts tended to reach
results-oriented outcomes.” 94
Against this backdrop, the EEA breezed through
Congress,95 providing harsh penalties for those caught stealing
trade secrets. By providing criminal relief, Congress helped
move the basis for trade secret misappropriation liability
deeper into the realm of property than ever before. In contrast
to existing laws, the EEA liability scheme was steeped in a
property rights approach. Simply proving that the defendant
obtained the information through means that were
unauthorized by the owner was enough.96
Because the actus reus and mens rea elements are much
easier to meet under the EEA than other statutes, such as the
Copyrights Act,97 prosecutors are more likely to use the EEA in
many cases where the defendant’s alleged actions result in
numerous overlapping federal charges. For example, under the
[D]efendant John Brown escaped prosecution under the National Stolen
Property Act (NSPA) because Brown’s former employer had shipped the
alleged trade secrets, a computer program and software manuals from a
former employer, to Brown on backup tapes that Brown himself owned. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case, holding that the NSPA “applies
only to physical ‘goods, wares or merchandise’ that were themselves ‘stolen,
converted or taken by fraud.’”
Burstein, supra note 87, at 324 (internal citations omitted).
90
See Burstein, supra note 87, at 315.
91
589 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1978).
92
Id. at 160 (concluding that the information was “property” under the
federal wire fraud statute).
93
See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1610 (2003).
94
Id. at 1611.
95
See Joseph F. Savage, Jr. et al., Trade Secrets: Conflicting Views of the
Economic Espionage Act, 15 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11 (2000).
96
Burstein supra note 87, at 323–24.
97
Id. at 325–26.
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EEA, there is no need to prove copyright infringement, which
can often prove difficult.98 Furthermore, the definition of “theft”
of a trade secret under the EEA is broader than the definition
used in the Restatement Third, or UTSA. Both sections 1831
and 1832 allow for five categories of theft: (1) outright theft; (2)
unauthorized duplication; (3) trafficking in stolen information;
(4) attempting to commit these three offenses; and (5)
conspiring to commit these three offenses.99 Section 1832 does
not even require the existence of an actual trade secret under
the attempt and conspiracy theories.100 Due to these lax
standards, successful prosecutions under the EEA have been
rapidly increasing in the last few years.101
Ultimately, developments in the common law, evidenced
by Kewanee, Monsanto, and the Restatement Third, along with
the passage of the EEA, leave no doubt that trade secret
protection has been broadly extended. Furthermore, it is quite
apparent that this expansion has benefited industry. Trade
secret’s original intellectual foundation was replaced by the
economic policy goals of classic forms of intellectual property,
i.e., patent and copyright law. Yet it was not always this way.
The next section will explain how trade secret law diverged
from its original intellectual foundation and will illustrate the
practical problems that result from the added protections built
into the law.
III.

TRADE SECRET LAW’S THEORETICAL DEVIATION FROM ITS
ORIGINAL DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION AND PRACTICAL
PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK

Although currently trade secret law is firmly
entrenched in an intellectual property regime with property
98

This is likely the reason that Robert Keppel, whom was accused of trade
secret theft for selling Microsoft certification exams over the internet, was not charged
with copyright infringement. See Press Release, CCIPS, Former Vancouver,
Washington, Resident Pleads Guilty to Theft of Trade Secrets from Microsoft
Corporation (Aug. 23, 2002), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/keppelPlea.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2005).
99
See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(5) (2000) (“[C]onspires with one or more other
persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one
or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy . . . .”).
100
See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A]ttempt and
conspiracy . . . do not require proof of the existence of an actual trade secret . . . .”).
101
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Computer Crime and
Intellectual Property Section: Economic Espionage Act Cases, at http://www.cyber
crime.gov/eeapub.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter DOJ, CCIPS: EEA
Cases].
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rights justified by an incentive-based rationale, the law was
developed around the premise that property rights in trade
secrets were created through the common-law “rule of capture.”
Part III.A explores the theoretical deviation from trade secret
law’s original doctrinal foundation and Part III.B describes the
practical problems that have resulted therefrom.
A.

The Abandonment of Trade Secret’s Firm Foundation

The current conceptualization of trade secrets as a form
of intellectual property is fundamentally inconsistent with
trade secret law’s original doctrinal foundation, which was
based on the common-law rule of capture. To understand where
the modern law has gone awry, it is necessary to start from the
beginning. As Judge Robert H. Bork has eloquently explained,
historical analysis is a powerful tool in exposing current legal
misconceptions:
One of the uses of history is to free us of a falsely imagined past. The
less we know of how ideas actually took root and grew, the more apt
we are to accept them unquestioningly, as inevitable features of the
world in which we move. [M]ost of us accept our first principles and
even our intermediate premises uncritically, as given, because we
assume that they were established theoretically and confirmed
empirically by legislators and judges long ago.102

1. From Common Law to the Restatement (First) of
Torts: The Changing Face of Trade Secret Law
The concept of a trade secret as we know it first took
root in the late 1830s103 and sprouted into a judicially
recognized right with the landmark 1868 opinion, Peabody v.
Norfolk.104 The plaintiff, Peabody, invented a new secret process
for making gunny cloth from jute butts. Peabody employed
Norfolk, who signed a written contract obligating him to keep
the process secret. Norfolk later left Peabody’s employment and
102

ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF

15 (1993).
103

See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. 523 (1837) (upholding the sale of the rights
to the secret art of making chocolate).
104
98 Mass. 452 (1868). For a more in-depth discussion of Peabody, see Bone,
supra note 12, at 252-54. Bone, supra note 12, at 253 (citing Peabody, 98 Mass. at 45758 (referring specifically to trademark law, patent law, and trade secret law)). Bone,
supra note 12, at 253 (citing Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457-58 (referring specifically to
trademark law, patent law, and trade secret law)).
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used the secret process to build a competing factory with James
Cook. Peabody sought an injunction against the continued
operation of the new factory.105 Among other defenses, Cook
argued that his original agreement with Peabody was
unenforceable because it was made in restraint of trade.
Rejecting Cook’s argument, Justice Gray of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court held Peabody’s trade secret to
be a property right that was not constrained by contractual
doctrines. This property right, Gray explained, was rooted in
the Lockean concept that Peabody’s personal effort in
enhancing the economic value of his business granted him a
property right in his trade secret: “If a man establishes a
business and makes it valuable by his skill and attention, the
good will of that business is recognized by the law as
property.”106 Gray explained the implications this general
principle had for trade secret law:
If [a person] invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of
manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or not, he has
not indeed an exclusive right to it as against the public, or against
those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it; but he has property
in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who in
violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it
to his own use . . . .107

Although the court spoke of a “property” right, it had
difficulty applying traditional property concepts—developed
with respect to tangible property—to the intangible object of
information. During this Natural Law period some judges and
theorists explained this difficulty away by utilizing a Lockean
conception of property for intangible ideas.108 John Locke
theorized that property rights originated in individual labor
and the productive use of property.109 The concept of property
during the late nineteenth century was explicitly linked to this

105

See Bone, supra note 12, at 252-53.
Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457. This broad principle was “clearly intended . . . to
unify all branches of what is today known as ‘intellectual property law.’” Bone, supra
note 12, at 253 (citing Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457-58 (referring specifically to trademark
law, patent law, and trade secret law)).
107
Peabody, 98 Mass., at 457-58 (emphasis added).
108
See Bone, supra note 12, at 254.
109
See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 17-18 (BobbsMerrill ed. 1952) (1690) (“Whatsoever then [a person] removes out of the state that
nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it
something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”)
106
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Lockean concept of labor and physical possession.110 The notion
was that the first possessor received property rights as a
reward for their labor.111 Modern economic arguments, such as
the incentive-based argument currently advanced for trade
secrets had not been developed.112
Of all the “bundle” of rights associated with property
ownership, the concept of exclusivity was the most difficult to
apply. The terminology used by the court in Peabody illustrates
this confusion. While the court stated that the owner of a trade
secret had a “property” right in his manufacturing process, the
right was said not to be “exclusive to [the holder] as against the
public.”113 In other words, the trade secret owner did not possess
one of the most important sticks in the bundle of property
rights—the right to exclude.
To account for this deficiency, ambitious courts
attempted to rationalize property rights in intangible ideas by
analogizing them to the common-law rule of capture.114 The
analogy between ideas and animals ran deep.115 Just as animals
were captured through physical labor and protected only to the
extent that they remained confined, ideas were captured
through discovery and protected only to the extent that they
remained secret.116 If the secret escaped, then it became public
property. Thus the only way to maintain one’s property rights
in information at common law was to keep it secret. This was a
direct extension of the generally accepted Lockean concept of
just-deserved rights, and was therefore well received. In 1904,
the Second Circuit, in Werckmeister v. American Lithographic
Co., described this common-law reasoning as follows:
[Ideas] are as free as the birds of the air or the wild beasts of the
forest, but they belong to him who first reduces them to captivity. . . .
110

See Ghen v. Rich, 8 Fed. 159, 161 (D. Mass. 1881) (attaching the right of
property in a whale to the first person that shoots the whale with a distinctively
marked harpoon); Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 177-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (attaching
property in a fox to the first person bringing it under control, articulating the wellknown “capture rule”).
111
See SINGER, supra note 47, at 16-18. For an argument in favor of this rule
see generally Richard Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221
(1979).
112
See Bone, supra note 12, at 253.
113
Id. at 253.
114
Id. at 254.
115
This analogy was expressly made in the common-law copyright case of
Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321, 324 (2d Cir. 1904), which is
quoted infra text accompanying note 117.
116
Bone, supra note 12, at 255.
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To pursue the foregoing analogies, the common-law protection
continues only so long as the captives or—creations are kept in
confinement or controlled.117

Hence, during these formative years, all branches of
intellectual property law were conceptualized through the “rule
of capture.” At common law, exclusive possession was
necessary for property rights to attach.118 These common-law
principles, in turn, applied to all forms of information:
“possession” of information required both discovery and
exclusion through secrecy. Once the information found its way
into the commons, though, the property right disappeared and
instead was owned communally.119
It is at this point that trade secret law diverged from
other forms of intellectual property law—to wit, patent and
copyright law. While trade secret law remained a creature of a
common-law system that did not protect information once it
became public, the early Patent and Copyright Acts protected
the ideas when they were released into the public. It was
reasoned that since the ideas were now “public property,” it
was up to the public to enact protective legislation.120 Yet unlike
patent and copyright law, no statutes were passed to protect
trade secrets once they entered the public domain.
This extra layer of statutory protection afforded to a
copyright owner by virtue of statutory right is exemplified by
Werckmeister. In Werckmeister, the common-law copyright
principles allowed for the creator to release his “captured”
ideas first, but did not protect the ideas once they were let
free—it only protected the copyrighted material prior to its
publication.121 But, because there was a statute involved, the
court explained that subsequent public dissemination did not
destroy the creator’s property rights: “[t]he statute permits [the
ideas] to go free and releases the restraint, provided the owner
has stamped them with his brand.”122

117

Werckmeister, 134 Fed. at 324.
See Bone, supra note 12, at 254.
119
See id. at 255 (citing Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 407
(W.D. Mich. 1908) (“The property in a secret process is the power to make use of it to
the exclusion of the world. If the world knows the process, then the property
disappears.”) (quoting Cincinnati Bell Foundry Co. v. Dodds, 10 Ohio Dic. Reprint 154
(1887))).
120
See Bone, supra note 12, at 255.
121
Werckmeister, 134 Fed. at 324.
122
Id.
118
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During these formative years, the common-law
principles that protected an owner’s interest in intangible ideas
prior to publication were consensually viewed as superior to
the post-publication statutory protections.123 While common-law
schemes were firmly rooted in the historically and culturally
accepted Lockean concept of just-deserved rights, statutes were
viewed simply as “expressions of historically and culturally
contingent social policy”124 whose added protections granted to
copyright and patents through statute were not viewed as
firmly rooted. In fact, it was thought that trade secret law’s
strong link to the common law made it a superior method of
protection to the post-publication protections afforded through
the statutory patent and copyright schemes.125 Hence, at this
stage trade secret law had a firm foundation of policy grounded
in these common-law concepts.
With the advent of legal realism, however, courts and
scholars abandoned this firm basis.126 Around the early 1920s
the age of legal realism brought an entirely new and more
“modern” conceptualization of trade secret protection.127 The
change in legal philosophy undermined the common-law
property rights approach of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Especially weakened was the claim “that
exclusivity through secrecy implied property and that property
implied legal rights [in trade secrets] . . . .”128 During this
period, the basis for liability stemmed not from the defendant’s
violation of the holder’s property right granted at common law,
but instead was based on the wrongfulness of the defendant’s
conduct. This new approach focused on the relationship
between the trade secret holder and the alleged wrongdoer. In

123

See Bone, supra note 12, at 256 (“These statutory rights were treated as
subordinate to common-law property rights . . . .”).
124
Id. (citing 1 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 90-110
(1881); Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conception of Ideal
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-26
(1989); Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance
Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1112-22 (1986)).
125
Bone, supra note 12, at 256.
126
Id. at 259-60.
127
See id. at 259 (citing ROBERT SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN
LEGAL THEORY (1982); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT (1973); G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV.
999 (1972)).
128
Bone, supra note 12, 259.
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E.I. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland,129 Justice
Holmes encouraged this view:
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant
knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence
that he accepted. The property may be denied but the confidence
cannot be. Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not
property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in
confidential relations with the plaintiffs . . . .130

In his explanation, Justice Holmes clearly stated that
the starting point of analyzing liability for the
misappropriation of secret information was “not property,” but
the “confidential relations” shared by the parties.131 This
approach effectively changed how secret information was
protected under the law of trade secrets. This evolution in
trade secret law shifted the legal framework from common-law
property rights, which focused upon the rights which attached
to the plaintiff’s secret, to a new theory that focused upon the
wrongful conduct of the defendant. Essentially, the property
rights rationale was abandoned and the basis of liability was
now closer to contract and tort law; liability hinged on whether
the wrongdoer had violated a confidence, not a property right.
At this point, courts and scholars alike rebuked the idea
that the owner of a trade secret had a property interest in that
secret. In 1938, the Restatement (First) of Torts, which
contained the first-ever unified definition of a trade secret,
reported that the property conception “has been frequently
advanced and rejected.”132 Instead, the Restatement (First) of
Torts explained that the theory of liability rested upon “a
general duty of good faith.”133 No longer was it thought
necessary to define a trade secret holder’s right as a property
interest. Professor Handler summed up the feeling of the era
nicely: “For one to reap with impunity the fruits of another’s
labor may be reprehensible, but the creation of new species of
property interests and new series of monopolies by the courts
may be disastrous to free enterprise.”134 Hence, the idea of
property rights in trade secrets were not only abandoned, but
altogether denounced.
129
130
131
132
133
134

244 U.S. 100 (1917).
Id. at 102.
Id.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. a (1939).
Id.
Milton Handler, Unfair Competition, 21 IOWA L. REV. 175, 189 (1936).
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This new conceptualization of trade secrets presented a
problem. The new theoretical model deviated from trade
secret’s original foundation, and remained unconvincing. The
law no longer possessed the strong foundation upon which to
rest its policy that it had during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.135 No longer did trade secrets possess a
strong “justifying theory and . . . normative independence from
other fields of law.”136 Instead, trade secrets were now protected
by forbidding the wrongful conduct of another, just like
contract or tort law. Yet the property-like characteristics of
trade secrets, such as the ability to assign the secret, or its use
as the res of a trust, made for an imperfect fit. The stripping
away of trade secret’s common-law property foundation left a
gap that courts and scholars have been trying to fill ever
since.137
In the 1970s and 1980s the Supreme Court attempted to
fill this gap by adopting the policy goals for trade secrets that
are commonly articulated to support more traditional forms of
intellectual property, such as copyright and patent law.138 As
the following section will illustrate more thoroughly, this too
was an imperfect fit. The deviation from trade secret law’s
original framework is in large part responsible for the
unpromising current state of the law.
In sum, trade secret law has been struggling to find a
satisfactory framework and rationale after the collapse of its
original theory. Liability was first grounded in a property
rights rationale supported by the rule of capture. As legal
concepts changed, liability was centered on the wrongful
conduct to another and the concept of property rights was
altogether dropped. As a result, trade secrets suddenly found a
home in the Restatement (First) of Torts—an area of the law
where it did not quite fit. Then, trade secrets were analogized
to more traditional forms of intellectual property when the
Supreme Court adopted the economic incentive-based
argument used to support the existence of patent and copyright
laws. As the following section will illustrate, this too was
inappropriate.
135

Bone, supra note 12, at 260.
Id.
137
Id. at 260 n.90 (setting forth the major attempts by courts and
commentators to justify trade secret law, including the idea of “unfair competition,”
which was quite popular in the first half of the twentieth century).
138
See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
136
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2. An Unfit Rationale—Trade Secrets are Different
The above historical tour reveals that, despite the
Court’s current treatment of trade secret law as a form of
intellectual property, the fit is quite poor. Trade secrets are
different. The incentive-based policy rationale adopted in
Kewanee does not fit trade secrets, as the quid pro quo of public
disclosure does not exist. The policy rationales do not at all
explain the need for protecting trade secrets as property.
Furthermore, as a practical matter, the added protections built
into the law through the EEA create a powerful tool for
industry to exclude valuable discoveries from society, further
imperiling the future of innovation.
First, and foremost, the economic policy rationale that
trade secrets enhance incentives to create, thereby benefiting
society, is unconvincing. This incentive-based argument “is well
established as the principal economic justification for
intellectual property rights in general.”139 While the argument
is compelling for both copyright and patent law, it is a very
difficult sell with trade secret law. Even the scholars of the
legal realism era that abandoned trade secret’s original firm
basis recognized the danger of an explicitly economic
justification. Indeed, the Restatement (First) of Torts expressly
rejected this incentive-based rationale:
The patent monopoly is a reward to the inventor. But such is not the
case with a trade secret. Its protection is not based on a policy of
rewarding or otherwise encouraging the development of secret
processes or devices. The protection is merely against breach of faith
and reprehensible means of learning another’s secret.140

The Court in Kewanee also admitted that it is difficult to
reconcile the secret element of trade secret law with the
disclosure of patent law, which is “the quid pro quo of the right
to exclude.”141 The Court reasoned convincingly that in most
cases where trade secrets operate, the “law will encourage
invention in areas where patent law does not reach, and will
139

Bone, supra note 12, at 262 (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW
ECONOMICS 112-16, 135-49 (1988)); see also William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325-63 (1989)
(applying the incentive-based argument to copyright); Kenneth W. Dam, the Economic
Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 247 (1994) (applying the incentivebased argument to patent law).
140
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
141
Kewanee, 416 U.S. at 484 (emphasis added).
AND
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prompt the independent innovator to proceed with the
discovery and exploitation of his invention.”142 But it is when
the inventor has a choice between using patent law and trade
secret law where the Court’s reasoning is highly questionable.
The majority argued that “[t]he possibility that an inventor
who believes his invention meets the standards of patentability
will sit back, rely on trade secret law, and after one year of use
forfeit any right to patent protection . . . is remote indeed.”143
The majority’s baseless assumption that an inventor
would rarely rely on trade secret law in place of patent law was
highly questionable then, and downright wrong now. Both
Justice Marshall’s concurrence and Justice Douglas’ dissent
called into question the majority’s key assumption in this area.
Justice Marshall agreed with the Court’s decision that trade
secret law was not in conflict with federal patent law, but he
believed “that the existence of trade secret protection
provide[d] . . . in some instances a substantial disincentive to
entrance into the patent system, and thus deprives society of
the benefits of public disclosure of the invention which it is the
policy of the patent laws to encourage.”144 Justice Douglas’
dissenting opinion argued that trade secret law did in fact
frustrate federal patent law’s objectives. As such, Douglas
argued that the majority’s reasoning ran contrary to two of the
Court’s earlier decisions; accordingly, he believed the state
trade secret law regime was preempted by the federal patent
scheme.145
This area of tension between trade secrets and the
policy goals of patent law, highlighted by Justices Douglas and
Marshall, has grown even tauter today. Patent and copyright
owners receive their property rights in exchange for disclosure
142

Id. at 485.
Id. at 490.
144
Id. at 494 (J. Marshall, concurring).
145
Justice Douglas argued:
Today’s decision is at war with the philosophy of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234. We held that when an article is unprotected by a patent, state law
may not forbid others to copy it, because every article not covered by a valid
patent is in the public domain. Congress in the patent laws decided that
where no patent existed, free competition should prevail; that where a patent
is rightfully issued, the right to exclude others should obtain for no longer
than 17 years, and that the States may not “under some other law, such as
that forbidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind that clashes with
the objectives of he federal patent laws[.]”
Id. at 495 (J. Douglas, dissenting).
143
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to society. With trade secret law, this disclosure could
theoretically never take place. It is this area of tension that
runs contrary to the second stated policy rationale of trade
secret law: “encourag[ing] creation” for the betterment of
society as a whole.146 The argument that society loses little in
the process may hold merit when it comes to trade secrets such
as advertising campaigns, customer lists and business
methods, but it runs contrary to the policy of public disclosure
when it comes to patentable items of invention, processes,
procedures and techniques that would benefit society. The
rarity in which an occasion like this was thought to occur may
explain the Court’s decision at the time, but it definitely calls
into question whether providing a property right to the holder
is justified if these occasions become increasingly common.
With the numerous added protections currently built into the
law, the incentive to keep an invention a trade secret, where
disclosure could theoretically never take place, has increased
tremendously.
Furthermore, the first policy rationale articulated by
the Court in Kewanee—that trade secret law encourages
commercial ethics—is not a convincing reason to supply
property rights. This policy rationale is justified as protecting
the traditional community norms that have developed over
time. But as one commentator laments, this justification
sounds more like “lofty aspirational goals” than a workable
framework of law.147 Moreover, it is not necessary to create a
property right to safeguard commercial norms. As Justice
Holmes explained, liability may be predicated on a tort or
contract theory that imposes liability based on a defendant’s
wrongful conduct.148 The idea that trade secret law encourages
commercial ethics appears to be more of an added benefit to
protecting interests in trade secrets than it is an actual
rationale for protecting them as “property.” Hence, the
146

See Kewanee 416 U.S. at 481.
Chiappetta, supra note 17, at 86.
148
Justice Holmes argued for a rationale based more upon a contract or tort
theory, where liability was based upon the violation of a confidence. He famously
stated:
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not, the defendant knows
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted.
The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. Therefore the
starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, but
that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs . . . .
E.I. duPont deNemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917).
147
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Monsanto decision, which recognized trade secrets as property
under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, is not
supported by these poorly developed rationales.
Monsanto’s faulty reasoning is further evidenced by the
fact that the Court was forced to revert to formalistic notions of
property to justify granting a property right to Monsanto.149 The
Court used language that harped back to the formalistic rule of
capture analysis from the late nineteenth century, utilizing the
natural rights concept of “just deserved” property rights
through “labour.”150 This is telling because it indicates that
property rights in trade secrets cannot rest squarely upon the
economic justification explicitly expressed for trade secret law,
and borrowed from traditional forms of intellectual property,
i.e., copyright and patent law. In addition, this incentive-based
economic rationale leads many towards the mistaken belief
that trade secret law is simply another form of intellectual
property. The reality, as one commentator so simply stated, is
quite the opposite: “Trade secret law is fundamentally
different.”151
The recognition of a property right in trade secrets has
attracted much controversy. One commentator has opined that
trade secret law “is merely a collection of other legal norms—
contract, fraud, and the like—united only by the fact that they
are used to protect secret information.”152 Indeed, “[t]he
relational focus of trade secret’s liability rules aligns trade
secret law more closely with the law of contract than with the
law of property.”153 Hence, a property right in trade secrets is
arguably altogether unnecessary, as other legal theories, such
as contract and tort law, possess all the tools necessary to
protect against the misappropriation of ideas.
Yet despite the problems noted above, trade secret law
expanded on the criminal front without attempting to sort
through the doctrinal morass. The EEA, passed to benefit
industry, is essentially a canon being used to kill a mosquito.
Scholars complain that the over-broad language remedied the
ills of industrial espionage too thoroughly.154 For example,
149

See text accompanying notes 61-62.
See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003 (1984); see also text
accompanying note 62.
151
Bone, supra note 12, at 244.
152
Id. at 245.
153
Id. at 244.
154
See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 86, at 884; Burstein, supra note 87, at 326.
150
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Professor Moohr argues that the EEA’s expansive definition of
trade secrets expands the range of protected material so much
so that it “raises constitutional vagueness and notice issues.”155
Professor Burstein argues that this expansion creates an
incentive for prosecutors to utilize the EEA rather than other
federal criminal statutes because the elements are much easier
to make out.156
Until 1996, trade secret law was solely developed and
cultivated under state law. As rationales justifying trade
secrets shifted back and forth in the courts and
157
Restatements, Congress was curiously indifferent. Although
large sections of the United States Code are dedicated to
158
159
patent and copyright law, federal legislation has only come
160
recently in the law of trade secrets and is quite sparse. Yet as
the tendency to analogize trade secrets to other forms of
intellectual property increased, Congress’s indifference was
intriguingly replaced with fervor to strengthen a law that was
already sorely misunderstood.
What is extremely troubling about the EEA is that
legislative history shows absolutely no evidence of a
substantive discussion of how the EEA would interact with
trade secret law’s stated policy goal of encouraging innovation
for the benefit of society.161 Rather, the committee reports and
floor debates illustrate the one-sided, pro-business nature of
the EEA. Indeed, Congress did not hear any testimony from
experts in the intellectual property field. In fact, all of the
testimony was given by self-interested industry experts.162 The
result is a law that has received much criticism from scholars,163
while providing extremely strong protections for industry.
155

Moohr, supra note 86, at 884.
Burstein, supra note 87, at 325-26.
157
See supra Part II.A.
158
The entirety of Title 17 is dedicated to Copyright Law. See Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C §§ 101–1301 (2000).
159
The entirety of Title 35 is dedicated to Patent Law. See Patent Act, 35
U.S.C. §§ 1–331 (2000).
160
See Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2000).
161
See Craig L. Uhrich, The Economic Espionage Act—Reverse Engineering
and the Intellectual Property Public Policy, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 147,
171 (2001) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 4-8 (1996)) (discussing the importance of
proprietary information and the inadequacy of state civil remedies); S. Rep. No. 104359, at 5-12 (1996) (adding reports of the increasing incidence of economic espionage
and a discussion of the need for a comprehensive federal law).
162
See Uhrich, supra note 161, at 170–71.
163
See, e.g., id.; Moohr, supra note 86, at 884.
156
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Ultimately, the current trade secret scheme is deeply
entrenched in a property right regime, but the policy goals
currently supporting the law do not fit. Not only has this new
theoretical model deviated from trade secret’s original
foundation, but also as a practical matter, the added
protections built into the law have effectively swung the
pendulum directly towards the interests of industry. As will be
shown in the next section, this current theoretical framework
has the unfortunate consequence of constricting socially
beneficial innovation.
B.

Practical Problems with the Current Trade Secret
Framework: De Facto Monopolies and Collective Action
Dilemmas

As trade secret holders enjoy the added protections built
into the law, society suffers as the law’s tendency to strangle
innovation increases. In particular, owners of chemical
inventions may enjoy de facto monopolies in their ideas
because they are usually impossible to reverse engineer.
Constricting the free-flow of information creates a collective
action problem whereby inventors cannot build upon the ideas
of others.
1. De Facto Monopolies: Inventions that are
“Beneficial to Society” but Impossible to Reverse
Engineer
Chemical inventions, which are extremely difficult to
reverse engineer, can enjoy a much longer period of exclusive
use if the inventor does not apply for a patent.164 Daniel C.
Munson, a chemical inventor and lawyer, argues that certain
industrial inventions are better candidates for trade secret
protection than others.165 Whereas electrical or mechanical
inventions are easily reverse engineered, as evidenced by the
164

See Daniel C. Munson, The Patent-Trade Secret Decision: An Industrial
Perspective, 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 689, 699–702 (1996).
165
See generally id. Ironically, Munson comes to the conclusion, despite his
earlier contentions, that federal patent law does not preempt state trade secret law
because patents are easier to obtain for chemical inventions than other types.
Munson’s conclusion appears inapposite to the weight of his paper, which enumerates
the many reasons a chemical inventor would prefer trade secret protection.
Furthermore, as trade secret law receives increased protection it is reasonable to
conclude that it could become even more attractive to these same inventors.
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legion of suits filed in the early 1990s involving semiconductor
design, chemical compounds cannot be. Thus, as a practical
matter, trade secret protection is impossible to maintain for
mechanical or electric inventions, but almost assured for
chemical formulae.166 For example, the formula for Coca-Cola
has never been reverse engineered, even though it has existed
for well over a hundred years.167 As one of the most well-known
and profitable companies in the world,168 the formula is
undoubtedly a great target for reverse engineering.
Nevertheless, not a single manufacturer has been able to
duplicate it.
However, although the secrecy of a soft drink formula is
hardly detrimental, suppression of information poses a very
real problem when the nature of that information is socially
beneficial. For example, suppose a company discovers a
formula for a clean-burning fuel alternative, a product
extremely difficult to reverse engineer. Further assume that
the company is a subsidiary of an oil company. This company
could either patent the technology and suppress it for twenty
years,169 or keep it as a trade secret. Given these two choices, a
company would likely choose to go the trade secret route
because, assuming the information could not be discovered
independently, the company could effectively maintain
indefinite and exclusive use of its invention. Nothing prevents
that company from shielding the rest of the world from the
benefits of that invention forever. In fact, federal criminal laws
provide harsh sanctions for anyone who discloses the formula.170
166

See id. at 690–97.
See The Coca-Cola Company at http://heritage.coca-cola.com (last visited
Apr. 25, 2005). The drink was invented by John Pemberton, an Atlanta pharmacist, in
1886. Id. To this day, almost 120 years later, the formula has remained a secret.
168
The aggregate market value of the common equity of the Coca-Cola
Company as of June 30, 2004 was over $105 billion. See The Coca-Cola Company,
United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, available at
http://www2.coca-cola.com/investors/pdfs/form_10K_2004.pdf (last visited May 11,
2005).
169
This example is very similar to the actions taken by Standard Oil in 1929.
“Once Standard Oil acquired [hydrogenation process] patent rights, it showed little
interest in using the hydrogenation processes in production. Instead, it was more
interested in blocking the threat that liquid fuels and coal lubricants posed to the oil
industry.” Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 389, 409 (2002).
170
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)-(b) the maximum fine for individual offenders is
$ 250,000, the same as for mail and wire fraud. Id. § 3571(b) (providing the general fine
provision). Penalties for violations that benefit foreign governments, instrumentalities,
or agents carry a penalty for individuals of fines up to $500,000 and imprisonment not
167
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While current regulations already guide pharmaceutical
products towards the law of patents,171 there are other areas of
industry where beneficial inventions may be kept secret to the
detriment of society forever.
The above example is not farfetched. Intellectual
property has been utilized to shield the public from socially
beneficial inventions in the past.172 Indeed, companies have
often used intellectual property law as a means of withholding
ideas that are beneficial to society, but harmful to their bottom
line.173 For example, in the 1960s Liggett & Myers Company
discovered and patented174 the “XA” cigarette, a cigarette with
most of the carcinogenic agents removed. However, for various
reasons, it was never released to the public and all of the
research was suppressed.175 Liggett finally announced plans to
release the “safer” cigarette in 2001, after the tobacco industry
finally admitted to the carcinogenic effects of smoking.176 Had
Liggett introduced the product sooner, many lives could have
been spared. At the least, an earlier release of the XA cigarette
would have spurred other cigarette companies to seek out
similar developments. Instead, this knowledge was suppressed
for many years.
This is just one of many examples of intellectual
property rights being used to suppress ideas that could prove

more than fifteen years. Id. at § 1831(a). When the defendant is an organization, the
fine may reach $10 million. Id.
171
Due to strong public welfare concerns, the pharmaceutical industry is
heavily regulated by the government. Extensive disclosure and testing is often required
before a product is deemed approved for massive public release. Thus, trade secret law
is a poor fit for protection here. See Munson, supra note 164, at 698 n.22.
172
See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 169, at 392-93; Michael A. Gollin, Using
Intellectual Property to Improve Environmental Protection, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 193,
223 (1992).
173
See Saunders, supra note 169, at 395–96.
174
There can be no empirical data from the realm of trade secret law directly
proving this premise because trade secrets are just that—secret. An example from
patent law here illustrates that companies will suppress knowledge or developments if
they could hurt their bottom line.
175
See Saunders, supra note 169, at 393 (citing First Am. Compl., City &
County of San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 1996) (No. C-96-2090-DLJ),
available at http://stic.neu.edu/ca/sf/1stamcomplaint.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005)).
The reasoning behind this was that admitting there could possibly be a
safer cigarette would imply that existing cigarettes were in fact dangerous.
Furthermore, Phillip Morris allegedly threatened retaliation if Liggett released
information regarding smoking and health. See id. at 394.
176
See id at 394-95.
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extremely beneficial to society but harmful to a company’s
bottom line.177
2. Trade Secret Protection in Research Developments
and Collective Action Dilemmas
A related problem to idea suppression occurs when
trade secrets are granted for research developments in
chemical compounds that are beneficial to society. Although,
due to government regulations, an actual cure for cancer would
need to be patented in order to be distributed publicly,178 a
discovery that constitutes a significant step towards that cure
does not. This means that trade secrets will protect a broad
array of information that does not formally qualify for patent
protection.
As exemplified by the recent case of Teller v. Teller,179
there is a rather low threshold for property rights to vest in a
trade secret. In Teller, the Supreme Court of Hawaii had to
decide precisely when a property right vested in a trade
secret.180 Mrs. Teller agreed that Mr. Teller’s secret weather
radio invention was created three months prior to their
marriage, thus qualifying as “pre-marital property” under
Hawaii law, and rendering the property “separate” for purposes
of equitable distribution. The court reasoned that “one owns a
property right in a trade secret when one knows of it . . . .”181
This means that a trade secret is certain to vest before the
property right in a patent because under federal law the right
in a patent accrues once it is issued by the Patent Office.182

177

For numerous other examples see id. at 407–17.
Government regulations make disclosures mandatory, so that drugs can be
tested and FDA approval can be issued prior to distribution. See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n).
The section states in pertinent part:
In the case of any prescription drug distributed or offered for sale in any
State [the following must be disclosed] . . . (2) the formula showing
quantitatively each ingredient of such drug to the extent required for labels .
. . , and (3) such other information in brief summary relating to side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness as shall be required in regulations which
shall be issued by the Secretary in accordance with the procedure . . . .
Id.
179
53 P.3d 240 (Haw. 2002).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 249 (quoting DTM Research, LLC v. AT&T Corp. 245 F.3d 327, 332
(4th Cir. 2001)).
182
See id. at 250 (citing GAF Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Elk Corp. of Dallas, 90
F.3d 479, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
178
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Hence, the holder of a trade secret has a property right in that
secret as soon as it is discovered. 183
Yet deciding that property rights vest from the moment
of discovery harms innovation. Future innovators will not be
able to learn from the crucial insights. Moreover, other firms
will continue to research the same area, thus duplicating
efforts.184
A pending case being prosecuted by the U.S.
Department of Justice—United States v. Zhu,185 illustrates that
research developments will be receiving protection under trade
secret criminal laws. In June of 2002, a pair of research fellows
at Harvard University were charged under the EEA for the
theft of trade secrets from a Harvard laboratory.186 It was
alleged that the two stole proprietary and highly valuable
scientific information belonging to Harvard with the intention
of profiting from such information by collaborating with a
Japanese company. The information in question was the
derivative of two genes that blocked the activity of calcineurin.
This genetic derivative possibly offered a way to treat a
number of diseases affecting the immune, cardiovascular, and
nervous systems.187 Although the discoveries were made by the
two research fellows being prosecuted, they signed a
Participation Agreement that assigned all property rights to
discoveries and inventions to Harvard. Furthermore, the two
research fellows used the Harvard laboratory, which was
funded in part by the National Health and the American
Cancer Society, along with Harvard’s information, technology
and chemical reagents to discover the genes.188
Although the behavior of the two research assistances
appeared criminal, the case highlights the overly broad
protection afforded to socially beneficial information. Critically,
the information involved in this case was not easily reverse
engineered and had the potential to benefit society greatly.
183

See id. at 249. “This is an intensely fact-driven analysis because the
moment at which an idea blossoms into a property right protected by statute will in
large part, be dependent upon the content of the secret.” Id.
184
See Bone, supra note 12, at 266-67.
185
See DOJ, CCIPS: EEA Cases, at http://www.cybercrime. gov/eeapub.htm
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
186
See Press Release, CCIPS, Pair Charged with Theft of Trade Secrets from
Harvard Medical School, (June 19, 2002), at http://www.cybercrime.gov/zhu
Charges.htm (last visited April 20, 2005).
187
Id.
188
Id.
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Moreover, by bringing a criminal action, the government
appeared to cast the EEA’s protective net over information that
was not in itself a complete product, but rather information
that constituted a critical step to finding a cure. After all, the
newly discovered genes may have been crucial parts of a
process that could lead to cures for a number of diseases.
Nonetheless, the consequences appear dire for the research
fellows. Although the case has yet to be tried, acquittals are
very rare under sections 1831 and 1832.189
But protecting these ideas as property before an actual
invention is fully realized risks potentially locking away
valuable ideas that lead to larger discoveries forever.
Economists refer to this as a collective action problem. An
economic model known as game theory explores this concept.190
A simple and often cited example to illustrate a collective
action problem is the Prisoner’s Dilemma:
Two criminals are arrested. They both have committed a serious
crime, but the district attorney cannot convict either of them for this
crime without extracting at least one confession. The district
attorney can, however, convict them both on a lesser offense without
the cooperation of either. The district attorney tells each prisoner
that if neither confesses, they will both be convicted of the lesser
offense. Each will go to prison for two years. If, however, one of the
prisoners confesses and the other does not, the former will go free
and the latter will be tried for the serious crime and given the
maximum penalty of ten years in prison. If both confess, the district
attorney will prosecute them for the serious crime but will not ask
for the maximum penalty. They will both go to prison for six years.191

Although the best choice is for both to remain silent, the
prisoners’ inability to communicate with each other means that
they will both likely choose the inferior option.192 A similar
dilemma could very easily take place in the realm of trade
secret law. Let us assume that there are two companies, A and
B, which both employ scientists to search for a clean-burning
alternative to gasoline. Scientist A will not make the discovery
because he cannot find the missing link to his formula, which is
otherwise almost complete. Scientist B has discovered this
189

The Department of Justice has not lost many of their attempts to prosecute
thus far under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. See DOJ, CCIPS: EEA Cases, at
http://www.cybercrime.gov/eeapub.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
190
See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical
Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM & MARY L. REV. 1 (2003).
191
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 33 (1994).
192
See id.
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missing link, but does not know how to apply it. This
knowledge will be kept secret forever in hopes that Company A,
where Scientist A works, will eventually discover the
information that Scientist B already has. Company B will keep
this discovery secret in the hope that it will one day make the
discoveries that Company A already has. Since the current
trade secret scheme encourages innovation through financial
reward, creating an atmosphere of competition, these secrets
must be kept at all costs in order to maintain a competitive
advantage over the other firm. Scientists A and B cannot
communicate because the information is the property of their
respective companies and is protected by federal criminal
statutes193 as well as civil common-law systems. Consequently,
the information could be held captive forever.
As Companies A and B continue researching and
developing a clean-burning alternative to gasoline, both will be
expending unnecessary time and money. However, if both
companies were able to gain knowledge from the other through
collective action, the clean-burning alternative to gasoline
would be invented, and the two companies would share the
patent rights. Therefore, as in the prisoner’s dilemma, both
companies would be better off if they were able to coordinate
their actions. However they are not currently able to do so
because of preclusive barriers to collective action.194 The tools of
game theory identify this problem and provide a framework for
understanding the optimal regulation of information
transferal.195
Ultimately, the current trade secret framework
discourages cooperation and has the potential to shield socially
beneficial ideas from the public forever. De facto monopolies in
socially beneficial ideas flip the constitutionally mandated
policy goal of benefiting society on its head. Hence a change in
the law of trade secrets is necessary in order to further the
public’s right to socially beneficial ideas.
193

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)-(b) (2000) the maximum fine for individual
offenders is $250,000. Id. § 3571(b) (providing the general fine provision). Penalties for
violations that benefit foreign governments, instrumentalities, or agents carry a
penalty for individuals of fines up to $500,000 and imprisonment not more than 15
years. Id. at §1831(a). When the defendant is an organization, the fine may reach $ 10
million. Id. at § 1831(a)-(b)
194
Albeit this is an extremely simplified hypothetical, yet “[t]he purpose of
using economic tools to analyze legal problems is to build simple models that capture
the forces at work.” BAIRD ET AL., supra note 191, at 269.
195
Id. at 268-69.
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SOLUTIONS TO THE ABOVE PROBLEMS: AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF COOPERATION

The current trend of protectionism in the law of trade
secrets has swung the pendulum too far in the direction of
industry. As a result, society is suffering. The current trade
secret apparatus must be altered so that the crucial balance
necessary to benefit both society and industry is struck. The
following two solutions hope to aid in swinging the pendulum
back in the direction of society to reach that balance. First, an
affirmative defense should be created to encourage the
disclosure of socially beneficial developments that are being
suppressed from the public. Second, the government should
encourage and seek out ways to facilitate cooperation within
those particular industries engaged in the production of
socially beneficial products.
A.

Creating an Affirmative Defense for Theft of Trade
Secrets that are “Beneficial to Society”

Where an invention or idea stands to benefit the health
and wellbeing of society, that invention or idea must find its
way into society. The law should not act to constrict such
knowledge, but should instead encourage spreading it as
rapidly as possible. This section proposes the EEA be amended
to create an affirmative defense that requires a defendant show
that the information he/she improperly disclosed or stole was
being suppressed by the company and would be of great
“benefit to society.” This affirmative defense should also be
utilized in civil actions for misappropriation.
In Part III.B.1 this Note discussed the XA cigarette as
an example of the problems that patent suppression present.
As a proposed solution to the patent suppression problem,
Professor Saunders points to a compulsory licensing system
“whereby a court would order a patentee that is not using its
patent to license the patent to another who will make use of
it.”196 Michael Gollin, a lawyer with a background in
biochemical science, also points to mandatory licensing
provisions as a possible solution to ideas with environmental
implications being suppressed.197 Gollin points to section 308 of
196
197

Saunders, supra note 169, at 434.
Gollin, supra note 172, at 223.
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the Clean Air Act of 1970198 as a good example of legislation
that forces patent holders to license their technology under
directed circumstances.199 However, trade secrets do not fall
under this provision.200 Gollin concludes that “[t]he treatment of
trade secrets in the principal environmental statutes is
inconsistent with promoting innovation.”201
The difficulty with creating a mandatory licensing
scheme for trade secrets is readily apparent. The most
important element of the trade secret is secrecy. It is
impossible to forcibly license something that you do not know
exists. Hence, it is imperative that those inside be encouraged
to divulge secrets that are of great benefit to society as a whole.
Creating an absolute affirmative defense to any trade
secret theft or misappropriation action, could help to swing the
pendulum back in the favor of society. The onus would be on
the defendant to make out three elements: First, the defendant
must prove the trade secret is extremely difficult to discover
independently and reverse engineer; next, the defendant must
show that the trade secret in question would perform a
valuable benefit to the health and wellbeing of society; and
finally, that the company was suppressing its discovery. Thus,
once it is proven by the plaintiff or prosecution that the
knowledge or invention in question is a trade secret, the
burden of proof would be upon the defendant to prove the three
elements of the affirmative defense.
The first element of the affirmative defense is: The
invention is extremely difficult to reverse engineer. This element
could be proven by expert testimony of scientists in the field.
As discussed above, a large majority of these items are likely to
be chemical inventions and formulas. Conversely, mechanical
devices are unlikely to ever pass this first prong. A computer
company’s source code (human-readable code in which software
developers write programs) may also pass muster under this
first prong, but would have great difficulty under the next.
Next, the defendant must prove that the invention in
question performs a valuable benefit to the health and
198

42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000).
The section requires certain conditions to exist in order to mandate
licensing: (1) The patented invention is needed to achieve emission limitations; (2) No
alternative methods are available; and (3) The patent reduces competition or
monopolizes it. Id.
200
Gollin, supra note 172, at 223.
201
Id. at 234.
199
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wellbeing of society. This will obviously be an area of strong
contention. Exactly what is a “valuable benefit to the health
and wellbeing of society,” and where should one draw the line?
The goal here is to use the law as a tool to extract those
inventions and formulas that are most beneficial to society
while protecting those that have a more commercial purpose,
such as a soft drink formula, or source code. It is difficult to
formulate a rule that distinguishes between a product like a
clean-burning alternative to gasoline and a soft-drink formula.
On the one hand, it is necessary to balance industry’s interests
in protecting its property rights in research and development;
on the other, the health and wellbeing of society must be placed
above the interest of industry. Hence, a balancing of these
interests is necessary. The following are examples of inventions
that should qualify under this analysis:
1. The invention has the ability to save lives on a grand
scale.
2. The invention has the ability to protect the
environment through directly or indirectly improving the
quality of air, water, or other natural resources.
3. The invention has the ability to improve vastly the
quality of a human life (e.g., a cure for blindness, or a formula
that prevents breast cancer).
If the invention falls into one of the first three
categories, one should next analyze the likelihood of the
invention’s beneficial effect. If the beneficial effect upon society
is highly likely, that invention should be deemed “beneficial to
society.”
Finally, the defendant would need to show that the
owner of the trade secret was suppressing the idea or
invention. One must avoid allowing the improper disclosure of
a trade secret where the owner was merely suppressing the
secret for an innocuous reason, such as to improve upon the
new development. Examining factors such as the length of
delay and changes in the original development would aid in
this analysis.
In sum, the three-element affirmative defense should
aid in upholding the constitutionally mandated policy goal of
“promot[ing] the Progress of Science and [the] useful Arts.”202
By creating such a defense, trade secret owners would likely be

202

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also text accompanying notes 3, 72-79.
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wary of suppressing knowledge that could benefit society
because they would receive absolutely no remedy for its theft.
Although the solution above does not altogether fix the
problem of important discoveries being shielded from the
public, it does filter out those socially beneficial inventions that
could be shielded forever. It also helps to reduce an employee’s
or scientific team’s risk of being prosecuted or sued for
attempting to take their unused knowledge and useful
inventions elsewhere.
Admittedly, creating an affirmative defense may do
little to encourage inventors to come forward when their ideas
have been suppressed. One would have to be incredibly noble,
or foolhardy, to risk imprisonment, civil sanctions, and
litigation costs to ensure that their ideas found a way into the
public domain. However, what we punish represents what we
value as a society. Our laws define what we value as “good” in
American life. Hence, creating an affirmative defense would
also create an impetus as to what the law should be and, more
broadly, what values society should encourage.
B.

Encouraging Cooperation to Avoid Collective Action
Dilemmas

The current trade secret scheme forbids cooperation
among industry. The above discussion illustrates that this is an
extremely poor way to encourage innovation, as new ideas
build upon the ideas of others. To foster efficiency, the law
should encourage cooperation to avoid the all too common
problem illustrated in the prisoner’s dilemma—inefficient
results caused by a lack of information.
Legal scholars have recognized that these collective
action problems can be solved through legal involvement.
Indeed, a number of law and economic scholars at the
University of Chicago argue that “[c]ollective action problems
that fit the paradigm of the prisoner’s dilemma present a
possible case for legal intervention.”203 These scholars are not
alone; Professor Stearns uses game theory in arguing that the
dormant Commerce Clause is in fact used as a judicial method
to prevent states from enacting laws of mutual defection.204
That is to say, free trade—collective action—is mutually
203
204

BAIRD ET AL., supra note 191, at 34.
Stearns, supra note 190, at 86-87.
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beneficial to all states, but individual states would likely create
laws discriminating against each other and benefiting their
own local interests but for the watchful eye of the Supreme
Court.205
In In re Sutter-Butte By-Pass Assessment No. 6,206 the
California Supreme Court was faced with a collective action
problem involving the building of levees along areas subject to
flooding. Individual landowners were likely to build levees in
order to keep their land safe from floods; however, their action
would threaten flooding elsewhere. The rational response of
those across the stream would then be to build new and higher
levees. This would have resulted in costs that were actually
higher than if no levees were built at all.207 The court decided
that “the only adequate method of preventing this result was
the unification of the individualistic and antagonistic efforts . .
. into one comprehensive coordinating plan looking toward the
flood control of the river in its entirety.”208 Again, legal
intervention created the optimum solution, thus reducing costs
through avoiding a collective action problem.
Indeed, collective action was even used to maximize the
efficiency of research and development efforts aimed at
combating intense air pollution in the Los Angeles area. In
1988 the California legislature sought to drastically reduce the
emissions of vehicles as quickly as possible.209 To accomplish
this goal, the legislature sought cooperation among industry
leaders in the field. Thus, the Auto/Oil Group was formed,
consisting of three major auto manufacturers and fourteen
major petroleum companies.210 The group signed the Auto/Oil
Cooperative Agreement, where each pledged that the results of
their research would be made public and that none of the

205

Id. at 87 (describing the per se rule against facially discriminatory laws).
191 Cal. 650, 655–56 (1923).
207
BAIRD ET AL., supra note 191, at 32.
208
191 Cal. 650, 656 (1923).
209
See Scott H. Segal, Fuel for Thought, Clean Gasoline and Dirty Patents, 51
AM. UNIV. L. REV. 49, 55 (2001) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018(a)
(Deering 1995)).
210
See id. “The ‘Big Three’ U.S. automakers agreed to develop information on
how to reduce vehicle emissions ‘through improved gasoline formulations, alternative
fuels and advances in automobile technology . . . .” Id. at 55 n.51 (quoting UNOCAL,
INC., AUTO/OIL STUDY PROVISIONS (2001), available at http://www.unocal.com/
rfgpatent/rfgao.htm (last visited April, 20, 2005)).
206
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companies would claim proprietary interests.211 In order to
achieve the optimum results, the Group enlisted elements of
contract law to assure cooperation.
A similar solution could prove beneficial in the law of
trade secrets. Indeed, forcing cooperation as a system-wide
remedy to trade secret research developments would be
impossible to implement and equally impossible to regulate.
Thus, a less hard-line approach is necessary. The common
thread of the above examples is that they are all ad hoc
collaborations necessitated by pressing problems common to a
large group.
As has been illustrated above, there are areas of
research and development that are particularly prone to idea
suppression—for example, areas involving chemical compounds
that are extremely difficult to reverse engineer. Research
developments involving chemical compounds that are made in
areas such as Diabetes, Cancer, and Cardio-vascular disease
(to name but a few) are undoubtedly “beneficial to society.”
Indeed, “[t]here has been a dramatic increase in the attention
and resources devoted to partnership or collaborative
approaches to public health goals in the US.”212 Many nations213
and states214 have formed united fronts and consortia to avoid
duplicitous and wasteful medicinal research and encourage
cooperation.
Congress must be more in tune with the realities of
research when creating broad legal constructs such as the
EEA, and leave room for cooperative efforts such as these
among industry. As a whole, we must be receptive to voices of
change. We must avoid being the lukewarm supporters of
change that Machiavelli described half a millennium ago. If our
211

Unfortunately one of the members of the group, Unocal, took out patents
on certain technologies, which has caused much controversy. For an excellent
discussion of this, see generally Segal, supra note 209.
212
Paula M. Lantz et al., Can Communities and Academia Work Together on
Public Health Research? Evaluation Results from a Community-Based Participatory
Research Partnership in Detroit, 78 J. URB. HEALTH: BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 495, 495
(2001), available at http://www.futurehealth.ucsf.edu/pdf_files/Lantz.pdf (last visited
April 6, 2005).
213
See, e.g., IRISH CANCER SOCIETY, at http://www.irishcancer.ie (last visited
April 6, 2005); VICTORIAN BREAST CANCER RESEARCH CONSORTIM INC., at
http://www.cancervic.org.au/cancer1/research/breastconsort.htm (last visited April 6,
2005).
214
See, e.g., LOUISIANA CANCER RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, at http://www.lacrc
.net (last visited Apr. 6, 2005); NORTHERN INDIANA RESEARCH CONSORTIUM, at
http://www.nicrc.org (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
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legal framework is to foster efficiency for the benefit of society,
we must not be incredulous or fearful of sharing information,
especially in areas that stand to benefit the health and
wellbeing of society. Although competition undoubtedly
encourages innovation, in certain circumstances, so does
cooperation.
Admittedly, this solution falls short of the type of
analysis necessary for properly forming a workable framework
where trade secrets are shared at the most optimal of levels.
The use of game theory, though, could aid economists in
predicting what hypothetical companies are likely to do under
various legal frameworks, and, thus, which frameworks would
promote the greatest amount of innovation.215 Yet the purpose
of this Note is not so much to propose an exact solution as it is
to invite dialogue on this area of the law.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the forces Machiavelli described continue to
shape our world of innovation. The current trend of
protectionism has swung the pendulum too far in the direction
of industry. In order to balance the scales there is a need for
action. The proposed solutions advanced in this Note hope to
encourage the sharing of ideas that truly benefit society most.
By adding an affirmative defense that effectively strips away
any trade secret rights an owner possesses, the law would be
taking a step towards encouraging patenting and the limited
monopoly that comes with it. By encouraging and seeking out
ways to facilitate cooperation among industries that invent
particularly beneficial products, the law would be encouraging
a more optimal framework in which to operate. The two
problematic areas that have been pointed out are not
exhaustive, and the proposed solutions to those problems are
by no means absolute. They are merely a starting point.
The pendulum must swing back in the favor of society in
order for trade secret law to serve the constitutionally
mandated policy goals that intellectual property laws purport
to serve. In order to understand best how the law of trade
secrets frames the actions of industry and innovation, we must
begin to analyze areas that have gone untested for years. We
must work hard to strike a balance when history tells us those
215

See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 191, at 268.
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in control will do whatever possible to remain there. Thus, I
conclude with the hope that this Note encourages the reader to
question the current trend of expanding protection in trade
secrets and intellectual property as a whole. While I cannot
provide a comprehensive solution to the complex problems
discussed in this Note, questioning increased protection in this
area of the law is nonetheless a good starting point. Indeed, the
future of innovation depends on it.
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